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Dans la troisième partie, les professeurs Whyte et Lederman
présentent le droit canadien des libertés publiques par le biais
de textes bien choisis portant sur l'égalité devant la loi, les libertés
de parole, d'association et de religion et certains droits collectifs
en matière d'éducation et de langue . Le tout se termine sur un
commentaire relatif à la validité de la Loi québécoise sur la langue
officielle."
Le recueil des professeurs Whyte et Lederman est assorti
d'un index sélectif et succint, donc utile . En revanche, nulle
bibliographie générale . S'agissant d'un ouvrage didactique, celle
ci n'avait pas à rechercher l'exhaustivité . Bien au contraire. De
là à ce qu'elle n'existe pas du tout, il y a cependant une marge.
Il nous semble que les étudiants auraient mérité d'être informés
des principaux ouvrages généraux contemporains existant en la
matière au Canada. D'ailleurs, la qualité des notes bibliogra-
phiques fournies tout au long du recueil semble fort inégale . Dans
les chapitres historiques, par exemple, le choix semble même
parfois friser l'anarchie .
Au total, le recueil de droit constitutionnel préparé par les
professeurs Whyte et Lederman est de qualité. Malgré les cir-
constances de son avènement, dont nous avons indiqué le côté
négatif, il méritait certes d'être publié. Il est fort utile de l'avoir
sous la main. Il reste au Canada anglais à se donner le véritable
traité contemporain de droit constitutionnel dont il ne dispose
toujours pas.
I-I. BRUN*
Sentencing. By CLAYTON C. RUBY. Toronto : Butterworths . 1976 .
Pp. 537. ($55 .00)
Imagine a system of criminal law without sanctions -not just
the criminal law in the statutes, law reports and textbooks, but
the whole vast enterprise of investigations, trials, and adjudications
numbering in the tens of thousands every year . Imagine the
spectacle of a system constructed exactly as it is, complete with
elaborately garbed actors in elaborate surroundings, solemnly
arguing about and deciding weighty issues of innocence and guilt
and shades of guilt, without then doing anything about it-a
system in which, after the verdict (whether guilty or not guilty)
"o L.Q ., 1974, c. 6 (Bill 22) .
* H. Brun, Faculté de Droit, Université Laval, Québec .
386
	
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL. LV
is pronounced, all the participants including the person charged
go home, the worse only for wear .
What strikes one as strange, indeed ludicrous, about such
an image, is its utter pointlessness. This is because it is the
criminal sanction, the "sentence", which gives meaning to all
that comes before it . Indeed, considering the number of guilty
pleas and the number of trials whose only purpose is to determine
whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged or merely
of some lesser offence, it is a fair hypothesis that in most cases
the only real question is what the sentence is to be . Yet sentencing
is given less attention in legal education and scholarship than
virtually any other aspect of criminal law and procedure . And
the inevitable result of this is that lawyers and judges are ill-
equipped to deal with an integral and crucial aspect of their
work, one which has profound effects on the lives of the tens
of thousands of individuals every year. This unpreparedness is
painfully obvious to anyone if only from the change in tone
effected by a conviction in a criminal trial : from "respectful
submission" to helpful suggestion and from skilled legal reasoning
to unskilled moral and social theorizing .
The neglect of sentencing in the law schools, journals and
texts has been due in no small part to the fact that it is almost
perverse to speak of a "law of sentencing" at all. Sentencing is
still in the pre-rule stage of principles and policies . Judges are
given a wide "discretion"' among and within an increasingly
wide option of penal measures . The only restraints on this
discretion are the statutory maxima and (rarely) minima and
the powers of courts of appeal to vary sentences which they
consider "unfit". 2 The only guidance that is given for the exercise
of this discretion, apart from the purely nominal guidance of
most of the statutory criteria for choosing between alternative
measures,3 is what might be gleaned from elliptical appellate
opinions which enunciate ball-park principles covering the whole
panorama of possible justifications for criminal law. The matter
has been further complicated by the reluctance of the Supreme
1 The Criminal Code, R.S.C ., 1970, c. C-34, s. 645 (1).
2Ibid., s . 614.
3 For example, in order to "discharge" an accused, the court must
consider such a measure to be "in the best interests of the accused and
not contrary to the public interest", ibid ., s . 662.1 (1), and the discretion
to suspend the passing of sentence is to be exercised "having regard to
the age and character of the accused, the nature of the offence and the




Court of Canada, prior to its decision in Hill v. The Queen, 4 to
intervene in sentencing matters, so that it was more proper to
speak of ten sentencing systems than of one. It is still anybody's
guess as to how severe a limitation on its jurisdiction the Supreme
Court meant to impose when it said that its instant decision
"implies no departure from our rules of -never entertaining an
appeal concerning the fitness of a senténce".5
Out of all this confusion. comes Clayton Ruby's big, expensive
book, which he has misleadingly entitled Sentencing . I say "mis-
leadingly" because the book has little to do with the practice of
sentencing and is mainly concerned with the law of sentencing
as it appears in the reported opinions of courts of appeal on
sentencing appeals. The two-practice and law-should not
be confused . For while there is some warrant for assuming that
the more or less precise rules of criminal law and procedure are
applied as written, the legal imprecision and discretion which
give wide scope to individual judical inclination make such an
assumption naive where sentencing is concerned. - It, surprised
nobody when Hogarth demonstrated this' empirically some years
ago,s though some of his findings were, no doubt, embarrassing
to those who like to depict the practices -of criminal law enforce-
ment under the rubric of "criminal justice", that is to say as fair and
impartial. One notes, for example, Hogarth's finding that the
length of a sentence of imprisonment could be predicted five
times more accurately by knowing a few things about the judge
and nothing about the "legal" facts of the case than by knowing
everything about the case and nothing about the judge . 7
Apart from the odd unsupported generalization from the
narrow confines of his own Toronto practice," Ruby's only
4 (1975), 23 C.C.C . (2d) 321, overruling Goldhar v. The Queen,
[19601 S.C.R . 60.
5Ibid ., at p . 336 . In Hill, leave to appeal was granted on the question
of whether an appellate court could increase sentence on an accused's
appeal in the absence of a cross-appeal by the Crown .
6 John Hogarth, Sentencing as a Human Process (1971) .
7 Hill v . The Queen, supra, footnote 4, at pp. 348-351 .
s For example, we are told confidently on p. 92 that "[i]n Canada
there has never been any difficulty, as a matter of professional courtesy
and of fairness to the accused, obtaining from the Crown or the police
a copy of the criminal record of the accused" . Emphasis added . Yet a
recent nationwide survey of the criminal bar conducted by the Law Reform
Commission of Canada shows this to be somewhat of an overstatement :
Discovery in Criminal Cases ; Report on the Questionnaire Survey (1975),
p . 104 .
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gesture toward the actual practice of sentencing is the twenty-five
page Appendix entitled "Criminal Statistics 1962-1971" . How-
ever, the point of including all these figures is difficult to discern,
unless they are meant to demonstrate by juxtaposition the
meaninglessness of much of what is contained in the last chapter
on the "Range of Sentence". This chapter diligently plots the
parameters of the sentences for various offences as they appear
in the reported cases . But what good is it, for example, to point
out on page 448 that the "usual range in reported cases" of
offences relating to currency "appears to be between six months
and six years, or possibly longer" when the statistics on page
496 show that in 1971 almost sixty percent of those convicted
of such offences received either suspended sentences, fines or
terms of imprisonment of less than six months?
One does not suppose that Ruby merely intended to em-
barrass himself by the statistics in his Appendix . However, in
their current form they cannot really be used for any other
purpose. In the first place, they are fatally incomplete . Ruby has
carelessly neglected to include in his distribution of sentences of
imprisonment, any reference to the distribution of penitentiary
sentences, not to mention indeterminate reformatory sentences,
which, unfortunately for him, appear in separate tables in the
publication on which he relies .!' The omission renders somewhat
absurd his reproduction of the breakdown of determinate prison
sentences of under two years. The reader is specifically cautioned
against concluding from them that the longest sentence handed
down in 1971 for such offences as manslaughter, rape, robbery,
and so on was less than twenty-four months imprisonment .
In the second place, Ruby has left the statistics exactly as
they appear in the Statistics Canada publication, namely in
absolute figures with separate years on separate pages, making
them unusable without the aid of a calculator. Would it have
been so difficult for him to have calculated the percentages
himself and to have presented the whole twenty-five page span
of ten years of statistics in a couple of neat, simple and helpful
tables?
So Sentencing will enhance no one's understanding of the
practice of sentencing . Its only really serious concern is with the
law of sentencing, mainly as laid down by the various courts of
appeal . Of course, for those of us who do not have access to
s Statistics Canada, Statistics of Criminal and Other Offences 1971,
Tables 6B and 7.
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an up-to-date version of either Martin's or Carswell's edition of
the Criminal Code, Ruby has also thoughtfully reproduced page
after page (about eighty, -all told) of the original . These provisions
are usually presented to us unsullied by any sort of comment or
analysis except where they have found their way into the reported
cases. Many of these provisions are already out of date and this
is not always indicated."O Where it is, the indication comes in
the form of a laconic note to the effect that the just extensively
quoted sections have just been extensively amended. Naturally,
it is not Ruby's fault that statutes tend to be amended, but it
does reflect on the wisdom of reproducing instead of summarizing
or merely referring to the provisions .
We do get a reasonably thorough" and (so far as one can
tell) accurate description of many of the reported sentencing
cases, and this makes up most of the book . Unfortunately, Ruby's
"analysis" is completely bereft of any form of synthesis or even
coherent organization, let alone insight. Why, for example, he
chose to divide up the sentencing "factors" mentioned by appel-
late courts into aggravating (Chapter 6 : "Aggravating Factors"),
mitigating (Chapter 7 : "The Plea in Mitigation") and irrelevant
(Chapter 8 : "Matters that Are not Taken into Consideration on
Sentencing") factors, with scattered chapters on the "Criminal
Record" and the "Psychiatric Aspect of Sentencing" is beyond
this reviewer's understanding. This fragmentation is especially
puzzling in light of Ruby's apparent awareness of the more
thoughtful formats used by Cross12 and Thomasl3 to analyze
English sentencing law. If Ruby had used Cross's elementary
division of factors into those relating to the circumstances of the
offence ("gravity"), the circumstances of the offender ("char-
acter") and other factors relating to neither ("the avoidance of
a sense of injustice and the exercise of mercy"), 14 his readers
would not be forced to scurry between three or more chapters
in order to discover the law regarding such unified matters as
the relevance of the character and behaviour of the victim,15 the
to See Ch. 16 : "Sentence of Death".
11 The only significant omission is the rather inexplicable failure to
even -mention the , "preventive detention" provisions of the Criminal Code,
supra, footnote 1, Part XXI.
12 Ruper Cross, The English Sentencing System (2nd ed., 1975) .
13 D. A. Thomas, Principles of Sentencing (1970) .
14 Op . C it., footnote 12, pp. 155-171 .
15 Dealt with in Ch . 6 under "Characteristics of the Victim", Ch . 7
under "The Victim" and Ch. 8 under "Character of the Victim".
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circumstances surrounding the plea,' 6 and so on . Not only would
such an approach have made the book more convenient to use
(though certainly less convenient to write), it might also have
contributed to the rational criticism and, perhaps, development of
sentencing law.
In the insight department, the most Ruby seems to be able
to muster is the inspiration that the "central test" of sentencing
law is that "the sentence be appropriate to the offence and the
offender" . 17 This utter banality does double duty for Ruby as
at once the "central test" to be discerned beneath the welter of
cases and as his main critical perspective on the sentencing system .
He realizes neither that this is scant improvement on the
statutory concept of "fitness" nor that the crucial question is
how a given sentence is or can be justified as "appropriate" or
"fit". Is it retribution that the courts are after, or is it utility?
Is it general deterrence or special deterrence? Control or rehabil-
itation? Not only does Ruby not know the answer, he does not
even know that he is supposed to be asking the question. In
short, he has made the elementary error of mistaking conclusion
for test.
This absence of any framework for a critical analysis of
sentencing law is the book's most obvious defect. The first chapter
("General Principles of Sentencing") might have-should have
-provided such a framework, but on Ruby's own admission
he did not write this chapter but "[gave] it up as hopeless" .ls
Whoever did write it, it is mostly the gospel according to Herbert
Packer, that is to say the conventional criminological and theoret-
ical wisdom of liberal penology vintage 1968 . Anyway, it reads
more coherently and generally better in the original, and has more-
over, been overtaken by a decade of intensive study of the penal
system on all fronts .19
1s See section c. 7(b) of Ch . 3, sections P. and V. of Ch. 7 and section
K. of Ch. 8.
There are also such curiosities as the discussion under "Procedure"
of a case (McLean, at pp . 44-45) in which a court of appeal took
oppressive cross-examination by the Crown counsel into account as a
mitigating factor . Unless this is meant to teach Crown counsel the im-
propriety of oppressive cross-examination during trial, one would think
the proper place for such a discussion would be under "The Plea in
Mitigation" .
17P. 135 and passinz .
is P. viii.
19 For an extensive review of empirical research on the effectiveness of
penal measures, see E. A. Fattah, Deterrence : A Review of the Literature
in Law Reform Commission of Canada, Fear of Punishment (1976) . On
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So .most of Ruby's criticism is of the popularistic, shoot-
from-the-hip variety, much of which, when it is not contradicting
itself, contradicts much of what can be found, ironically enough,
in Chapter One. For example, on page 125 Ruby criticizes the
retributivistic view that imprisonment for offences in breach of
trust "is simply, by .way of punishment for their wrongs committed"
as being "perhaps outdated today" . . According 'to Ruby the "true
rationale seems to be that it is important for society as a whole
that one who acknowledges a trust should be held to it, and
that deterrent penalties therefore become the means whereby the
criminal law enforces that trust" . Yet on page 131 we find the
following opinion: "There can be no doubt that most crimes
imply a weakening of the fabric of law and deserve punishment
as such." This time, Ruby does not apparently think retributivism
"outdated" . And to cap it all off, if we compare the deterrent
"rationale" with the (incorrect) statement on page one that "the
history of the application of our present sentencing concepts
discloses that nothing we do has any significant effect on the
problem of crime in general", what do we get? Will the real
Clayton C. Ruby please stand up!
Outstanding among the contradictions in this book is Ruby's
defence of the sentencing -status quo so devastatingly criticized by
the only post-1970 work referred to in Chapter One, Struggle
for Justice20 The burning issue in sentencing is discretion . It is
everywhere in retreat2 l and for good reasons. Discretion, every-
body agrees, inevitably results in unequal treatment; it is a mask
for class and other prejudice (in the words of Struggle for Justice,
it allows one "to do the publicly unmentionable" and "to protect
one's own kind"22 ) ; and it is based on faulty criminological
premises about the possibility and justifiability of "individual-
ization" . Yet, oblivious to all this and with characteristic obscurity,
Ruby gives us the following- 23
the theory of punishment see recently Erik Olin Wright (ed .), The Politics
of Punishment (1973) ; Alf Ross, On Guilt, Responsibility and Punishment
(1975) and Ted Honderich, Punishment : The Supposed Justifications
(rev . ed ., 1976) . On sentencing see Law Reform Commission of Canada,
Working Paper No . 3 : The Principles of Sentencing and Dispositions
(1974) ; Vincent O'Leary et al., Contemporary Sentencing Proposals (1975),
11 Crim . .L.B . 555 ; A . von Hirsch, Doing Justice : The Choice of Punish-
ments (Report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration) (1 1 ,76) ;
Fair and Certain Punishment : Report of the Twentieth Century Fund
Task Force on Criminal Sentencing (1976) .
2'0 American Friends Service Committee (1971) .
21 See the sentencing references in footnote 19 .
22 Op . cit., footnote 20, pp. 134-143 .
23 P . 424.
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It is submitted that though our system permits greater divergence in
sentence, it retains the undoubted virtue of placing the particular
offence and the particular offender first in priorities . This should help
to keep sentencing human and minimize any tendency to devolve into
a mechanical enterprise. It would be wrong, in our sentencing system,
to ma[k]e any single factor more important than the principle that the
sentence be appropriate to the particular offence and the individual
offender. Sensitivity and flexibility in sentencing requires that the
approach to be taken should flow from the facts of the case and not
from any single rule, however useful or certain that rule may be .
Sentencing is "human" all right, but this kind of humanity we
can do without-unless "we" is restricted to judges, lawyers
and others beyond the reach of legalized oppression .
There are several minor annoyances in this book which
should not escape mention. Not least of these is Ruby's curious
brand of sexism . Of course, he goes out of his way to use the
de rigueur "Ms." whenever he encounters a female offender, but
the point is that he does not afford the same courtesy to male
offenders, whom he is quite comfortable in designating by their
untitled surnames . So, on the same page that "Ms. Luther" does
this, "Robinson" does that ;24 and on a page which deals with
sexual disparity in sentencing, we receive a gruff introduction to
crooks "Crosby" and "Hayes" in the same paragraph where
we meet the delicate "Ms. Potruff" .25 Of course, wherever pos-
sible, Ruby indulges in the more conventional sort of sexism
which uses "man" to mean person . 26
Stylistically, Sentencing is simply awful. The unbelievable
number of typographical (spelling?) errors apart, we are treated
to such bons mots as "[a] popular metaphor has it that `ignorance
of the law is no excuse' ".27 The book is characterized by sheer
sloppiness in writing as well as in thinking . As examples of the
former, one notes the confusion engendered by the phrase "in
that same case" on page 10628 and the leap through time made
24 P. 107. 25 Pp. 35-36.
26 E.g., p. 181 ("poor man . . . man of means") andp. 356 ("the victim
of crime has been the forgotten man in criminal law") .
27 P. 160, emphasis added. "Metaphor" apart, "popular" is rather a
strange way to characterize an ancient legal maxim enshrined in the
Criminal Code . Note also this tortuous sojourn into etymology: "The
term restoration has its origins in theology where it is a term equivalent
to restitution ; and both terms are used to indicate the process whereby
something taken from another is returned or restored to him." P. 356.
28 "We have seen that `in ordinary cases' the fact that someone is
suffering from mental disorder should not infiuence the court to impose a
higher sentence . In that same case an exception was noted for sexual
crimes . . . ."
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by McClennan J.A., on page 309 ("He emphasized . . . . He also
accepts") . As examples of the latter, on page 88 there is Ruby's
blithe acceptance of the distinction without a difference between
increasing a sentence and refusing "to extend leniency" on the
basis of the offender's criminal record and also, on page 29, his
logic-defying attempt to deduce from the fact that .Part 11 of the
Narcotic Control Act (civil commitment of "narcotic addicts")
has not been proclaimed in force, that the courts, in the exercise
of their ordinary sentencing discretion, have no legal justification
for incarcerating convicted drug-users at least partly for- the
purposes of cure .-29
'Sentencing is also rather offensive for a tone that varies
between complacency and obsequiousness . For example, it seems
to be Ruby's opinion that the now notorious abuses of the "plea
bargaining" system3° are overwhelmed by the more usual "frank
exchange of information between Crown counsel and defence
counsel, in the best traditions of the Bar"31 And where most
of the legal texts that I have come across are concerned at least
partly with analysis for the sake of rational criticism, Ruby states
his purpose to be "to set out and analyze principles so that more
29 Sloppy is also the best word for many of Ruby's excursions beyond
the realm of sentencing and into penal measures. For instance, his claim
that there is an essential dissimilarity between Canadian and British
practice relating to the parole of offenders sentenced to life imprisonment
(p. 109) is simply wrong . See D . J. West,, Parole in England : an Introduc-
tory Explanation in West (ed.), The Future of Parole (1972), p . 18 .
Similarly false is the statement on p . 62 that "banishment . . . has never
been part of the law of England nor of Canada" . Ruby seems to have
merely accepted without investigation an argument made by counsel, but
by no means accepted by the court, in R. v . Fuller, [1969) 3 C.C.C . 348,
at p. 350 which was based on a misinterpretation of a passage from
Stephens' Commentaries (16th ed ., 1914), vol . 1, p . 91 . For the correct
view, see W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1938), vol . XI,
p. 556 and J . Alex. Edmison, Some Aspects of Nineteenth-Century
Canadian Prisons, in W. T. McGrath (ed.), Crime and Its Treatment in
Canada (2nd ed ., 1976), pp . 351-353 .
30 See D. J. Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations : A Study
of Bargain Justice (1956), 47 J. Crim . L.C. and P.S . 780 ; A. S . Blum-
berg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation
of a Profession (1967), 1 Law and Soc . Rev . 15 ; B . A. Grosman, The
Prosecutor (1969), pp . 29-43 ; American Friends Service Committee, op .
cit ., footnote 20, pp . 136-139 ; G. A . Ferguson and D. W. Roberts, Plea
Bargaining : Directions for Canadian Reform (1974), 52 Can . Bar Rev.
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effective submissions can be made with a view to assisting the
sentencing judge"32
Admittedly, these are minor points . More important is what
I conceive to be the overriding intellectual failure of this work .
We are given a clue to it by the very first line of the preface:
This book contains everything about sentencing that I always wanted
to know and never bothered to look up .
The point is that there is more to "knowing" than merely
"looking up". And until Ruby learns this and abandons cutting
and pasting for some hard scholarship, his work in this field will
continue to be a waste of time and money.
MICHAEL MANDEL*
Estate Planning for Canadians. By JEAN MONET, Q.C. Assisted
by STEPHEN D. HART. Toronto : MacMillan of Canada . 1975 .
Pp. xiv, 378 . (No Price Given)
A number of hurdles confront the prospective author of a book
on tax planning . They arise in part from the complexity of our
tax legislation and the constant change in the pattern of federal
and provincial taxation over the last ten years. A more funda-
mental obstacle is presented by the nature of the mental exercise
involved . The author of a treatise on torts or contracts will be
mainly concerned to indicate the results which occur when
common law and statutes are applied to particular facts. In a
work on tax planning the emphasis is on the acts which might
be done and the transactions which might be entered into on
the facts of hypothetical situations in the light of existing statutes
and hypothetical non-tax objectives . There is thus both an addi-
tional question and an additional variable to be considered . Tax
planning advice will be affected by slight variations in either the
facts or the objectives and the utility of the work will depend to
a large extent on the range of hypotheses presented. If the author
attempts to cover the field by keeping the discussion at a fairly
general level the work is likely to degenerate into a collection
of platitudes and pious exhortations . At the other extreme the
book can be so precise and so replete with variations in the facts
22 P . vii.
*Michael Mandel, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto .
